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The Hegel Variations: “On the 
Phenomenology of the Spirit” by 
Fredric Jameson. London:  
Verso, 2010. pp. 144. $24.95 cloth.
The essayistic nature of Fred-
ric Jameson’s short new book on 
G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit should not blind us to the 
fact that the book offers a system-
atic interpretation of the entire 
inner structure of Hegel’s first 
masterpiece. Although The Hegel 
Variations comes from someone for 
whom reading Hegel is like eating 
daily bread, the book is readable 
as an introduction to Hegel while 
simultaneously providing precise 
interpretive hints worthy of the 
greatest Hegel specialists. In this 
review, I limit myself to four varia-
tions of my own, to four interven-
tions into the book’s key topics: 
Hegel and the critique of capitalism, 
the circle of positing presupposi-
tions, Understanding and Reason, 
and the eventual limits of Hegel. Of 
course, the critical nature of some 
of my remarks is based on my great 
admiration of Jameson’s work and 
on a shared solidarity in our struggle 
for the Hegelian legacy in Marx-
ism. One should remember here the 
proverb that says only the highest 
peaks are struck by lightning.
I
Jameson is right to draw attention 
to the fact that, “despite his famil-
iarity with Adam Smith and emer-
gent economic doctrine, Hegel’s 
conception of work and labor—I 
have specifically characterized it 
as a handicraft ideology—betrays 
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no anticipation of the originali-
ties of industrial production or the 
factory system”—in short, Hegel’s 
analyses of work and production 
cannot be “transferred to the new 
industrial situation” (68). There is a 
series of interconnected reasons for 
this limitation, all grounded in the 
constraints of historical experience 
at Hegel’s disposal. First, Hegel’s 
notion of industrial revolution was 
the Adam Smith–type manufac-
ture where the work process is 
still that of combined individuals 
using tools, and not yet the factory 
in which the machinery sets the 
rhythm and individual workers are 
reduced de facto to organs serving 
the machinery, to its appendices.
Second, Hegel could not yet 
imagine the way abstraction rules 
in developed capitalism: when Karl 
Marx describes the mad self-en-
hancing circulation of capital, whose 
solipsistic path of self- fecundation 
reaches its apogee in today’s metare-
flexive speculations on futures, it 
is far too simplistic to claim that 
the specter of this self- engendering 
monster that pursues its path dis-
regarding any human or environ-
mental concern is an ideological 
abstraction, and that one should 
never forget that, behind this ab-
straction, are real people and natural 
objects on whose productive capaci-
ties and resources capital’s circula-
tion is based and on which it feeds 
like a gigantic parasite. The prob-
lem is that this “abstraction” is not 
only in our (financial speculator’s) 
misperception of social reality, but 
that it is “real” in the precise sense 
of determining the structure of the 
very material social processes: the 
fate of whole strata of population 
and sometimes of entire countries 
can be decided by the solipsistic 
speculative dance of capital, which 
pursues its goal of profitability in a 
blessed indifference with regard to 
how its movement will affect social 
reality. Therein resides the funda-
mental systemic violence of capi-
talism, much more uncanny than 
the direct precapitalist socio-ideo-
logical violence: this violence is no 
longer attributable to concrete indi-
viduals and their “evil” intentions, 
but is purely “objective,” systemic, 
anonymous. Here we encounter the 
Lacanian difference between real-
ity and the Real: reality is the social 
reality of the actual people involved 
in interaction and in the productive 
processes, whereas the Real is the in-
exorable “abstract” spectral logic of 
capital that determines what occurs 
in social reality. This gap is palpable 
in the way the economic situation of 
a country is considered to be good 
and stable by the international fi-
nancial experts even when the large 
majority of people are living worse 
than before. Reality doesn’t matter; 
what matters is the situation of capi-
tal. . . . And, again, is this not more 
true today than ever? Do phenom-
ena usually designated as those of 
virtual capitalism (future trades and 
similar abstract financial specula-
tions) not point toward the reign 
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positing its own presuppositions. 
First, money appears as a mere 
means of exchanging commodities: 
instead of the endless bartering, 
one first exchanges one’s product 
for the universal equivalent of all 
commodities, which can then be 
exchanged for any commodity that 
one may need. Then, once the cir-
culation of capital is set in motion, 
the relationship is inverted, with the 
means turning into an end in itself; 
that is, the very passage through the 
“material” domain of use values (the 
production of commodities that sat-
isfy individuals’ particular needs) 
is posited as a moment of what is 
substantially the self-movement of 
capital itself. From that moment 
onward, the true aim is no lon-
ger the satisfaction of individuals’ 
needs, but simply more money, the 
endless repeating of the circulation 
as such. . . . This arcane circular 
movement of self-positing is then 
equated with the central Christian 
tenet of the identity of God the Fa-
ther and his Son, of the Immaculate 
Conception by means of which the 
single father directly (without a 
female spouse) begets his only son 
and thus forms what is arguably 
the ultimate single-parent family.
Is then capital the true Subject/
Substance? Yes and no. For Marx, 
this self-engendering circular move-
ment is—to put it in Freudian 
terms—precisely the capitalist un-
conscious fantasy that parasitizes 
the proletariat as pure substanceless 
subjectivity; for this reason, capital’s 
of real abstraction at its purest and 
much more radical than in Marx’s 
time? In short, the highest form of 
ideology does not reside in getting 
caught up in ideological spectral-
ity, ignoring its foundation in real 
people and their relations, but pre-
cisely in overlooking this Real of 
spectrality and in pretending to ad-
dress directly real people with their 
real worries. Visitors to the London 
Stock Exchange receive a free leaf-
let explaining that the stock market 
is not about some mysterious fluc-
tuations, but about real people and 
their products—this is ideology at 
its purest.
Here, in the analysis of the uni-
verse of capital, one should not only 
project Hegel toward Marx, but 
Marx himself should be radical-
ized: it is only today, in the postin-
dustrial form of global capitalism, 
that, to put it in Hegelian terms, 
really existing capitalism reaches 
the level of its notion: perhaps, one 
should follow again Marx’s old 
anti-evolutionist motto (inciden-
tally, taken from Hegel) that the 
anatomy of man provides the key 
for the anatomy of a monkey; that 
is, to deploy the inherent notional 
structure of a social formation, one 
must start with its most developed 
form.
Capital is money that is no 
longer merely wealth, its univer-
sal embodiment, but value that, 
through its circulation, generates 
more value—value that medi-
ates or posits itself, retroactively 
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speculative self-generating dance 
has a limit and brings about the 
conditions of its own collapse. Our 
everyday experience tells us that the 
ultimate goal of capital’s circulation 
is the satisfaction of human needs, 
that capital is just a means to attain 
this satisfaction more efficiently. 
Then there is the notion of capi-
tal as a self-engendering monster. 
In actuality, however, capital does 
not engender itself but exploits the 
worker’s surplus value. There is 
thus a necessary third level to be 
added to the simple opposition of 
subjective experience (of capital as 
a simple means of efficiently satis-
fying people’s needs) and objective 
social reality (of exploitation): the 
objective deception, the disavowed 
unconscious fantasy (of the mys-
terious self-generating circular 
movement of capital), which is the 
truth (although not the reality) of the 
capitalist process. Again, to quote 
Jacques Lacan, truth is structured 
like fiction: the only way to formu-
late the truth of capital is to pres-
ent this fiction of its “immaculate” 
self-generating movement. And 
this insight also enables us to locate 
the weakness of Jacques Derrida’s 
“deconstructionist” appropriation 
of Marx’s analysis of capitalism: 
although it emphasizes the endless 
process of deferral that character-
izes this movement, as well as its 
fundamental inconclusiveness, its 
self-blockade, the deconstruction-
ist retelling still describes the fan-
tasy of capital—it describes what 
individuals believe, although they 
don’t know it.
What all this means is that the 
urgent task of the economic analy-
sis today is, again, to repeat Marx’s 
critique of political economy with-
out succumbing to the temptation 
of the multitude of the ideologies 
of postindustrial societies. The 
key change concerns the status of 
private property: the ultimate ele-
ment of power and control is no 
longer the last link in the chain 
of investments, the firm or indi-
vidual who really owns the means 
of production. The ideal capitalist 
today functions in a wholly dif-
ferent way: investing borrowed 
money, “actually owning” noth-
ing, even indebted, but nonetheless 
controlling things. A corporation 
is owned by another corporation, 
which is again borrowing money 
from banks, which may ultimately 
manipulate money owned by or-
dinary people like ourselves. With 
Microsoft’s Bill Gates, the private 
property of the means of produc-
tion becomes meaningless, at least 
in the standard meaning of the 
private property. The paradox 
of this virtualization of capital-
ism is ultimately the same as that 
of the electron in elementary par-
ticle physics. The mass of each el-
ement in our reality is composed 
of its mass at rest plus the surplus 
provided by the acceleration of its 
movement; however, an electron’s 
mass at rest is zero; its mass con-
sists only of the surplus generated 
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bourgeois revolution doing away 
with traditional privileges) where 
all individuals recognize one an-
other as autonomous free subjects. 
This prodigious social leveling of a 
modern democracy
certainly does not exclude 
the emergence of wealth and 
of profound distinctions be-
tween rich and poor, even in 
the socialist countries. Nor 
is it in any way to be under-
stood as the end of classes in 
their economic sense: there 
are still workers and man-
agers in these societies, there 
are still profit and exploita-
tion, reserve armies of the 
unemployed, and so on and 
so forth. But the new cul-
tural equality . . . is infused 
with a powerful hatred of 
hierarchy and special privi-
leges and with a passionate 
resentment of caste distinc-
tions and inherited cultural 
superiority. It is permitted 
to be wealthy, so long as 
the rich man is as vulgar as 
 everyone else. (101)
This is a situation that, one might 
add, opens up the unexpected pos-
sibility of a genuinely proletarian 
reappropriation of the so-called 
high culture. All three of these cases 
seem to call for a Hegelian analysis: 
laborers reduced to an appendix of 
machinery; reality; and a hierar-
chy persisting in the very form of 
by the acceleration of its move-
ment, as though we are dealing 
with a nothing that acquires some 
deceptive substance only by magi-
cally spinning itself into an excess 
of itself. Do today’s virtual capital-
ists not function in a homologous 
way? Their net value is zero; they 
directly operate with just the sur-
plus, borrowing from the future.
The irony is not difficult to miss 
here: the fact that Marx needed 
Hegel to formulate the logic of 
capital (the crucial breakthrough in 
Marx’s work occurred in the mid-
1850s, when, after the failure of the 
1848 revolutions, he started to read 
Hegel’s Logic again) means that 
what Hegel wasn’t able to see was 
not some post-Hegelian or postid-
ealist reality of the properly Hege-
lian aspect of capitalist economy. 
Here, paradoxically, Hegel was not 
idealist enough; that is, what he did 
not see was the properly speculative 
content of the capitalist specula-
tive economy, the way the financial 
capital functions as a purely virtual 
notion processing “real people.”
Last but not least, the third 
critical point concerns the properly 
modern capitalist class struggle 
in its difference from traditional 
caste and feudal hierarchies: since 
Hegel’s notion of domination was 
limited to traditional struggle be-
tween master and servant, what he 
couldn’t envisage was a relation-
ship of domination that persists in 
a postrevolutionary situation (revo-
lution, of course, refers here to the 
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“plebeianization”—paradoxical re-
versals that seem to give body to all 




ing (Verstand), the “common-sense 
empirical thinking of externality, 
formed in the experience of solid 
objects and obedient to the law of 
non-contradiction” (119), as a kind 
of spontaneous ideology of our 
daily lives, of our immediate expe-
rience of reality. As such, it is not 
merely a historical phenomenon 
to be dissolved through dialectical 
critique and the practical change 
of relations that engender it, but 
a permanent, transhistorical, fix-
ture of our everyday reality. True, 
Reason (Vernunft) “has the task of 
transforming the necessary errors 
of Verstand into new and dialecti-
cal kinds of truths” (119), but this 
transformation leaves intact the 
everyday efficiency of Understand-
ing, its formative role in our ordi-
nary experience. All Reason can 
do is a kind of Kantian critical de-
limitation of the proper sphere of 
Understanding; that is, it only can 
makes us aware of how, in our daily 
lives, we are victims of necessary 
(transcendental) illusions. Under-
lying this reading of the opposition 
of Reason and Understanding is a 
profoundly non-Marxian notion of 
ideology (or, rather, a profoundly 
non-Marxian split of this notion) 
probably taken from Louis Al-
thusser (and, maybe, Lacan). In a 
Kantian mode, Jameson seems to 
imply two modes of ideology: a his-
torical one (forms linked to specific 
historical conditions that disappear 
when these conditions are abol-
ished, like traditional patriarchy) 
and an a priori transcendental one 
(a kind of spontaneous tendency 
to identitarian thinking, to reifica-
tion, etc., that is cosubstantial with 
language as such, and that, for this 
reason, can be assimilated to the il-
lusion of the big Other as the “sub-
ject supposed to know”).
Closely linked to this notion of 
ideology is Jameson’s (rarely no-
ticed, but all the more persistent) 
motif of the unsayable, of things bet-
ter left unsaid. For example, in his 
review of my Parallax View (2006) 
in the London Review of Books, his 
argument against the notion of 
parallax is that, as the name for the 
most elementary split/diffraction, 
it endeavors to name something 
that is better left unnamed. In a 
similar way, Jameson subscribes to 
the Kantian tendency of (some of) 
today’s brain scientists about the a 
priori structural unknowability of 
consciousness:
[W]hat Hegel’s contempo-
raries called the not-I is that 
which consciousness is con-
scious as its other, and not any 
absence of consciousness it-
self, something inconceivable 
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inescapable? Are we caught in it 
to the end, so that every specula-
tion about the outside is always 
already a retroactive fantasy from 
the standpoint inside, or, as Hegel 
would have put it, is every presup-
position already posited?
Jameson develops this impossi-
bility to break out in his perspicuous 
reading of the concept of positing 
as the key to what Hegel means by 
idealism. His first move is to dia-
lectically mediate the very opposi-
tion of positing and presupposing: 
The core of positing is not the direct 
production of objects, since such a 
production remains abstractly op-
posed to what is simply given. (I as 
a finite subject finds in front of me 
material objects and then proceeds 
to positing by working on them.) 
The core of positing concerns these 
presuppositions themselves—that 
is, what is primordially posited are 
presuppositions themselves. Recall 
Martin Heidegger’s notion of the 
essence of modern technology as 
Gestell: in order for the subject to 
manipulate/exploit reality techno-
logically, this reality has to be pos-
ited/presupposed (or, as Heidegger 
puts it, disclosed) in advance as an 
object of possible technological 
exploitation, as a reserve of raw 
materials and energies, etc. It is in 
this sense that one should conceive 
what is posited “in terms of presup-
positions: for positing somehow 
always takes place ‘in advance’ of 
other kinds of thinking and other 
kinds of acts and events” (27) or, 
except as a kind of science-
fictional picture-thinking, a 
kind of thought of otherness. 
But it is hard to understand 
how we could know some-
thing without knowing what 
its absence entails: and it may 
well be, as Colin McGinn 
argues, that consciousness 
is one of those philosophical 
problems which human be-
ings are structurally unfit to 
solve; and that in that sense 
Kant’s was the right posi-
tion to take: that, although 
its existence is as certain as 
the Cartesian cogito, con-
sciousness must also remain 
perpetually unknowable as a 
thing-in-itself. (32)
The least one can say about these 
lines is that they are profoundly 
non-Hegelian, even taking into ac-
count Jameson’s unexpected dialec-
tical point: since an element can be 
properly grasped only through its 
difference to its opposite, and since 
the I’s opposite—the not-I—is as 
inaccessible to the I as it is in-itself, 
the consequence of the unknow-
ability of the not-I as it is in-itself, 
independently of the I, is the un-
knowability of consciousness (the 
I) itself as it is in-itself. The stan-
dard solipsist-empiricist point that 
the subject can only know itself, its 
sensations, is thus proven wrong: if 
the not-I is unknowable, the I itself 
suffers the same lot. The question 
to be raised here is this: Is this circle 
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even more pointedly, “in terms of 
theatrical settings or pro-filmic 
arrangements, in which, ahead 
of time, a certain number of 
things are placed on stage, certain 
depths are calculated, and an op-
tical center also carefully provided, 
the laws of perspective invoked in 
order to strengthen the illusion to 
be achieved” (28):
Kant’s theory— phenomenon 
and noumenon—looks some-
what different if it is grasped 
as a specific way of positing 
the world. . . . [I]t is no longer 
a question of belief: of taking 
the existence of objective re-
ality, of the noumenon, of a 
world independent of human 
perceptions, on faith. But it is 
also not a question of follow-
ing in Fichte’s footsteps and 
affirming that objective real-
ity—the noumenon, which 
has now become the not-I—
is summoned into being by 
the primal act of the I, which 
“posits” it (now using the 
term in a metaphysical sense).
Rather, that beyond as 
which the noumenon is 
characterized now becomes 
something like a category of 
thinking. . . . It is the mind 
that posits noumena in the 
sense in which its experi-
ence of each phenomenon 
includes a beyond along with 
it. . . . The noumenon is not 
something separate from the 
phenomenon, but part and 
parcel of its essence; and it is 
within the mind that realities 
outside or beyond the mind 
are “posited.” (29)
We should introduce here a pre-
cise distinction between the presup-
posed/shadowy part of what appear 
as ontic objects and the ontological 
horizon of their appearing. On the 
one hand, as it was brilliantly de-
veloped by Edmund Husserl in his 
phenomenological analysis of per-
ceptions, every perception even of 
an ordinary object, involves a series 
of assumptions about its unseen flip 
side, as well as of its background; 
on the other hand, an object always 
appears within a certain horizon of 
hermeneutic prejudices that pro-
vide an a priori frame within which 
we locate this object and which 
thus make the object intelligible—
to observe reality without preju-
dices means to understand nothing. 
This same dialectic of positing the 
presuppositions plays a crucial role 
in our understanding of history:
[J]ust as we always posit the 
anteriority of a nameless ob-
ject along with the name or 
idea we have just articulated, 
so also in the matter of histor-
ical temporality we  always 
posit the preexistence of a 
formless object which is the 
raw material of our emer-
gent social or historical ar-
ticulation. (85–86)
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of these prehistorical societies, with 
detailed descriptions of their ritu-
als, systems of kinship, myths, 
etc.? The classic ethnology and 
anthropology were precisely stud-
ies of “prehistoric” societies, studies 
that systematically overlooked the 
specificity of these societies, inter-
preting them as a contrast to “civi-
lized” societies. Recall how, in their 
description of the primitive myths 
of origin, the early anthropologists 
read, say, the statement that a tribe 
originates from the owl, as a literal 
belief [“They really believe their 
predecessors were owls”], totally 
missing the way such statements ef-
fectively functioned.) If one misses 
the retroactivity of such positing of 
presuppositions, one finds oneself 
in the ideological universe of evo-
lutionary teleology: an ideological 
narrative thus emerges in which 
previous epochs are conceived as 
progressive stages/steps toward the 
present “civilized” epoch. This is 
why the retroactive positing of pre-
suppositions is the materialist “sub-
stitute for that ‘teleology’ for which 
[Hegel] is ordinarily indicted” (87). 
(Marx’s aforementioned statement 
about the anatomy of man offer-
ing the key to the anatomy of ape 
should be read in the same way: as 
the materialist reversal of teleologi-
cal evolutionary progress.)
This Jamesonian account none-
theless raises a number of critical 
points. Yes, presuppositions are 
(retroactively) posited, but the con-
clusion to be drawn from this is not 
This formlessness should also be 
understood as a violent erasure of 
(previous) forms: whenever a cer-
tain act is posited as a founding one, 
as a historical cut, the beginning of 
a new era, the previous social real-
ity is as a rule reduced to a chaotic 
ahistorical conundrum—say, when 
the Western colonialists “discov-
ered” Black Africa, this discovery 
was read as the contact of “prehis-
torical” primitives with civilized 
history proper, and their previous 
history basically blurred into form-
less matter. It is in this sense that the 
notion of positing the presupposi-
tions is “not only a solution to the 
problems posed by critical resistance 
to mythic narratives of origin . . . ; it 
is also one in which the emergence 
of a specific historical form retroac-
tively calls into existence the hith-
erto formless matter from which 
it has been fashioned” (87). This 
last claim should be qualified or, 
rather, corrected: what is retroac-
tively called into existence is not 
the hitherto formless matter but, 
precisely, a matter that was well ar-
ticulated before the rise of the new, 
and whose contours were blurred, 
became invisible, from the hori-
zon of the new historical form—
with the rise of the new form, the 
previous one is (mis)perceived as 
“hitherto formless matter”; that is, 
the formlessness itself is a retroac-
tive effect, a violent erasure of the 
previous form. (So what about 
the obvious counterargument: the 
abundance of ethnological studies 
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that we are forever caught into this 
circle of retroactivity so that every 
attempt to reconstruct the rise of 
the New out of the Old is noth-
ing but an ideological narrative. 
Hegel’s dialectic itself is not yet an-
other grand teleological narrative, 
but precisely the effort to avoid 
the narrative illusion of a continu-
ous process of the organic growth 
of the New out of the Old. The 
historical forms that follow one 
another are not successive figures 
within the same teleological frame, 
but successive retotalizations, each 
creating (positing) its own past (as 
well as projecting its own future). 
In other words, Hegel’s dialectic 
is the science of the gap between 
the Old and the New, of account-
ing for this gap. More precisely, its 
true topic is not directly the gap be-
tween the Old and the New, but its 
self-reflective redoubling—when it 
describes the cut between the Old 
and the New, it simultaneously de-
scribes the gap, within the Old it-
self, between the Old-in-itself (as it 
was before the New) and the Old 
retroactively posited by the New. 
It is because of this redoubled gap 
that every new form arises as a cre-
ation ex nihilo: the Nothingness out 
of which the New arises is the very 
gap between the Old-in-itself and 
the Old-for-the-New, the gap that 
makes impossible the account of 
the rise of the New in the terms of a 
continuous narrative. (Marx him-
self was aware of this gap when, 
in the last chapter of volume 1 of 
Das Kapital, he used the narrative 
of “so-called primordial accu-
mulation” to confront the cha-
otic brutality of the actual rise of 
capitalism.)
One should add a further quali-
fication here: what escapes our grasp 
is not the way things were before 
the arrival of the New, but the very 
birth of the New, the New as it was 
“in itself,” from the perspective of 
the Old, before the New managed 
to posit its presuppositions. This is 
why fantasy, the phantasmatic nar-
rative, always involves an impos-
sible gaze, the gaze by means of 
which the subject is already present 
at the scene of its own absence—the 
illusion is here the same as that of 
alternate reality whose otherness is 
also posited by the actual totality, 
which is why it remains within the 
coordinates of the actual totality. 
The way to avoid this utopian re-
duction of the subject to the impos-
sible gaze witnessing an alternate 
reality, from which he is absent, is 
not to abandon the topos of alter-
nate reality as such. Recall Walter 
Benjamin’s notion of revolution as 
redemption through repetition of 
the past: apropos the French Rev-
olution, the task of a true Marxist 
historiography is not to describe 
the events the way they really were 
(and to explain how these events 
generated the ideological illusions 
that accompanied them); the task is 
rather to unearth the hidden poten-
tiality (the utopian emancipatory 
potentials) that were betrayed in 
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avoided the Parliamentary 
corruption and the Fascist 
and Bolshevist revenges. But 
in this age of free-thinkers, 
men’s minds are not really 
free to think such a thought.
What I complain of is that 
those who accept the verdict 
of fate in this way accept it 
without knowing why. By a 
quaint paradox, those who 
thus assume that history al-
ways took the right turning 
are generally the very people 
who do not believe there was 
any special providence to 
guide it. The very rational-
ists who jeer at the trial by 
combat, in the old feudal or-
deal, do in fact accept a trial 
by combat as deciding all 
human history.1
In his less-known Everlasting 
Man (1926), Chesterton conducts 
a wonderful mental experiment 
along these lines, in imagining 
the monster that man might have 
seemed at first to the merely natu-
ral animals around him:
The simplest truth about 
man is that he is a very 
strange being; almost in the 
sense of being a stranger on 
the earth. In all sobriety, he 
has much more of the exter-
nal appearance of one bring-
ing alien habits from another 
land than of a mere growth 
of this one. He has an unfair 
the actuality of revolution and in its 
final outcome (the rise of utilitarian 
market capitalism). The point of 
Marx is not primarily to make fun 
of the wild hopes of the Jacobins’ 
revolutionary enthusiasm, to point 
out how their high emancipatory 
rhetoric was just a means used by 
the historical cunning of reason to 
establish the vulgar commercial 
capitalist reality; it is to explain how 
these betrayed radical-emancipa-
tory potentials continue to insist 
as kinds of historical specters that 
haunt the revolutionary memory, 
demanding their enactment, so 
that the later proletarian revolu-
tion should also redeem (put to 
rest) all of these past ghosts. These 
alternate versions of the past that 
persist in a spectral form constitute 
the ontological openness of the his-
torical process, as was clear to G. K. 
Chesterton:
The things that might have 
been are not even present 
to the imagination. If some-
body says that the world 
would now be better if Na-
poleon had never fallen, but 
had established his Imperial 
dynasty, people have to ad-
just their minds with a jerk. 
The very notion is new to 
them. Yet it would have pre-
vented the Prussian reaction; 
saved equality and enlight-
enment without a mortal 
quarrel with religion; uni-
fied Europeans and perhaps 
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advantage and an unfair dis-
advantage. He cannot sleep 
in his own skin; he cannot 
trust his own instincts. He 
is at once a creator moving 
miraculous hands and fin-
gers and a kind of cripple. 
He is wrapped in artificial 
bandages called clothes; 
he is propped on artificial 
crutches called furniture. His 
mind has the same doubtful 
liberties and the same wild 
limitations. Alone among 
the animals, he is shaken 
with the beautiful madness 
called laughter; as if he had 
caught sight of some secret 
in the very shape of the uni-
verse hidden from the uni-
verse itself. Alone among the 
animals he feels the need of 
averting his thought from 
the root realities of his own 
bodily being; of hiding them 
as in the presence of some 
higher possibility which cre-
ates the mystery of shame. 
Whether we praise these 
things as natural to man or 
abuse them as artificial in na-
ture, they remain in the same 
sense unique.2
This is what Chesterton called 
thinking backwards: we have to 
put ourselves back in time, before 
the fateful decisions were made or 
before the accidents occurred that 
generated the state that now seems 
normal to us, and the royal way to 
do it, to render palpable this open 
moment of decision, is to imagine 
how, at that point, history may 
have taken a different turn. (This, 
however, does not mean that, in a 
historical repetition in the radical 
Benjaminian sense, we simply re-
turn in time to the open moment 
of decision and, this time, make the 
right choice. The lesson of repeti-
tion is rather that our first choice 
was necessarily the wrong one, and 
for a very precise reason: the right 
choice is only possible the second 
time, after the wrong one; that is, it 
is only the first wrong choice that 
creates the conditions for the right 
choice. The notion that we might 
have made the right choice already 
the first time, and that we just ac-
cidentally blew the chance, is a ret-
roactive illusion.)
III
It is against this background that 
one can raise two further critical 
points about Jameson’s notion of 
Understanding as an eternal and 
unsurpassable form of ideology. 
The first thing to note is that this 
unsurpassable character is in itself 
redoubled: first, there is Under-
standing as the a priori tendency 
of human thinking toward iden-
titarian reification; then, there is 
the unsurpassability of the circle of 
positing the presuppositions, which 
prevents us from stepping outside 
ourselves to grasp the not-I in all its 
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To break up an idea into its 
ultimate elements means re-
turning upon its moments, 
which at least do not have 
the form of the given idea 
when found, but are the im-
mediate property of the self. 
Doubtless this analysis only 
arrives at thoughts which are 
themselves familiar elements, 
fixed inert determinations. 
But what is thus separated, 
and in a sense is unreal, is 
itself an essential moment; 
for just because the concrete 
fact is self-divided, and turns 
into unreality, it is something 
self-moving, self-active. The 
action of separating the ele-
ments is the exercise of the 
force of Understanding, the 
most astonishing and great-
est of all powers, or rather the 
absolute power. The circle, 
which is self-enclosed and 
at rest, and, qua substance, 
holds its own moments, is an 
immediate relation, the im-
mediate, continuous relation 
of elements with their unity, 
and hence arouses no sense 
of wonderment. But that an 
accident as such, when out 
loose from its containing 
circumference,—that what 
is bound and held by some-
thing else and actual only by 
being connected with it,—
should obtain an existence 
all its own, gain freedom 
and independence on its own 
forms, spatial and temporal (from 
outside reality as our own histori-
cal past is independent of us). The 
first critical point to be made here is 
that the features Jameson attributes 
to Understanding (“common-sense 
empirical thinking of externality, 
formed in the experience of solid 
objects and obedient to the law of 
non-contradiction”) clearly are his-
torically limited: they designate the 
modern/secular empiricist com-
mon sense very different from, say, 
a primitive holistic notion of reality 
permeated by spiritual forces.
However, a much more impor-
tant critical point concerns the way 
Jameson formulates the dichotomy 
between Understanding and Rea-
son: Understanding is understood as 
the elementary form of analyzing, 
of drawing the lines of fixed dif-
ferences and identities; that is, of 
reducing the wealth of reality to an 
abstract set of features. This sponta-
neous tendency toward identitarian 
reification has to be then corrected 
by dialectical Reason, which faith-
fully reproduces the dynamic 
complexity of reality by way of 
outlining the fluid network of rela-
tions within which every identity 
is located. This network generates 
each identity and, simultaneously, 
causes its ultimate downfall. . . . 
This, however, is emphatically not 
the way Hegel conceives the dif-
ference between Understanding 
and Reason—let us read carefully a 
well-known passage from the fore-
word to Phenomenology:
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account—this is the porten-
tous power of the negative; 
it is the energy of thought, of 
pure ego. Death, as we may 
call that unreality, is the most 
terrible thing, and to keep 
and hold fast what is dead 
demands the greatest force 
of all.3
Understanding, precisely in its 
aspect of analyzing, tearing the 
unity of a thing or process apart, is 
here celebrated as “the most aston-
ishing and greatest of all powers, 
or rather the absolute power”—as 
such, it is, surprisingly (for those 
who stick to the common view of 
dialectics), characterized in exactly 
the same terms as Spirit which is, 
with regard to the opposition be-
tween Understanding and Rea-
son, clearly on the side of Reason: 
“Spirit is, in its simple truth, con-
sciousness, and forces its moments 
apart.” Every thing turns on how 
we are to understand this iden-
tity and difference between Un-
derstanding and Reason: it is not 
that reason adds something to the 
separating power of Understand-
ing, reestablishing (at some higher 
level) the organic unity of what 
Understanding has torn apart, 
supplementing analysis with syn-
thesis; Reason is, in a way, not 
more but less than Understanding. 
It is—to put it in Hegel’s well-
known terms of the dichotomy 
between what one wants to say 
and what one actually says—what 
Understanding, in its activity, really 
does, in contrast to what it wants/
means to do. Reason is therefore 
not another facility supplementing 
Understanding’s one-sidedness: the 
very idea that there is something 
(the core of the substantial content 
of the analyzed thing) that eludes 
Understanding, a transrational Be-
yond out of its reach, is the funda-
mental illusion of Understanding. 
In other words, all we have to do to 
get from Understanding to Reason 
is to subtract from Understanding 
its constitutive illusion—Under-
standing is not too abstract/violent; 
it is, on the contrary, as Hegel put 
it a propos Kant, too soft toward 
things, afraid to locate its violent 
movement of tearing things apart 
into things themselves.4 In a way, it 
is epistemology versus ontology: the 
illusion of Understanding is that its 
own analytic power—the power to 
make “an accident as such, when 
out loose from its containing cir-
cumference,—that what is bound 
and held by something else and ac-
tual only by being connected with 
it,—. . . obtain an existence all its 
own, gain freedom and indepen-
dence on its own account”—is only 
an abstraction, something external 
to true reality that persists out there 
intact in its inaccessible fullness. 
In other words, it is the standard 
critical view of Understanding 
and its power of abstraction (that 
it is just an impotent intellectual 
exercise missing the wealth of real-
ity) that contains the core illusion 
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philosophies of difference 
and otherness seem only able 
to confront with mystical 
evocations and imperatives. 
(131)
Instead of trying to under-
mine or overcome this narcissism 
from the outside, emphasizing 
the preponderance of the objec-
tive (or that the Whole is the non-
true and all other similar motifs 
of Theodore Adorno’s rejection of 
identitarian idealism), one should 
rather problematize the figure of 
Hegel criticized here by way of 
asking a simple question: which 
Hegel is our point of reference 
here? Do not Georg Lukács and 
Adorno both refer to the idealist-
subjectivist (mis)reading of Hegel, 
to the standard image of Hegel as 
the absolute idealist who asserted 
Spirit as the true agent of history, 
its Subject-Substance? Within this 
framework, capital can effectively 
appear as a new embodiment of the 
Hegelian Spirit, an abstract mon-
ster that moves and mediates itself, 
parasitizing upon the activity of 
actually existing individuals. This 
is why Lukács also remains all too 
idealist when he proposes to simply 
replace the Hegelian Spirit with the 
proletariat as the Subject-Object 
of History: Lukács here is not re-
ally Hegelian, but a pre-Hegelian 
idealist.
If, however, one problema-
tizes this presupposition shared 
by Lukács and Adorno, another 
of Understanding. To put it in yet 
another way, the mistake of Un-
derstanding is to perceive its own 
negative activity (of separating, 
tearing things apart) only in its 
negative aspect, ignoring its posi-
tive (productive) aspect—Reason is 
Understanding itself in its produc-
tive aspect.5
IV
Even Jameson succumbs to this 
classical anti-Hegelian topic when 
he identifies narcissism as that 
which “may sometimes be felt to be 
repulsive in the Hegelian system as 
such” (130) or, in short, as the cen-
tral weakness of Hegel’s thought 
expressed in his claim that rea-
son should find itself in the actual 
world:
We thereby search the whole 
world, and outer space, and 
end up only touching our-
selves, only seeing our own 
face persist through multitu-
dinous differences and forms 
of otherness. Never truly to 
encounter the not-I, to come 
face to face with radical oth-
erness (or, even worse, to find 
ourselves in an historical dy-
namic in which it is precisely 
difference and otherness 
which is relentlessly being 
stamped out): such is the di-
lemma of the Hegelian dia-
lectic, which contemporary 
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Hegel appears, a more materialist 
Hegel for whom reconciliation be-
tween Subject and Substance does 
not mean that the subject swal-
lows its substance, internalizing it 
into its own subordinate moment. 
Reconciliation rather amounts to a 
much more modest overlapping or 
redoubling of the two separations: 
the subject has to recognize in its 
alienation from the Substance the 
separation of the Substance from 
itself. This overlapping is what is 
missed in the Feuerbach-Marxian 
logic of de-alienation in which the 
subject overcomes its alienation by 
recognizing itself as the active agent 
who itself posited what appears to 
it as its substantial presupposition. 
In the Hegelian reconciliation be-
tween Subject and Substance, there 
is no absolute Subject that, in total 
self-transparency, appropriates or 
internalizes all objective substantial 
content. But “reconciliation” also 
doesn’t mean (as it does in the line of 
German idealism from Hölderlin 
to Schelling) that the subject should 
renounce its hubris of perceiving 
itself as the axis of the world and 
accept its constitutive decentering, 
its dependency on some primordial 
abyssal Absolute that is beyond/
beneath the subject/object divide 
and, as such, also beyond subjective 
conceptual grasp. The subject is not 
its own origin: Hegel firmly rejects 
Fichte’s notion of the absolute I that 
posits itself and is nothing but the 
pure activity of this self-positing. 
But the subject is also not just a 
secondary accidental appendix/
outgrowth of some presubjective 
substantial reality: there is no sub-
stantial Being to which the subject 
can return, no encompassing or-
ganic Order of Being in which the 
subject has to find its proper place. 
Reconciliation between subject and 
substance means the acceptance of 
this radical lack of any firm foun-
dational point: the subject is not its 
own origin, it comes second, it is 
dependent upon its substantial pre-
suppositions; but these presupposi-
tions also do not have a substantial 
consistency of their own but are al-
ways retroactively posited.
What this also means is that 
Communism should no longer be 
conceived as the subjective (re)ap-
propriation of the alienated sub-
stantial content—all versions of 
reconciliation as “subject swallows 
the substance” should be rejected. 
So, again, reconciliation is the full 
acceptance of the abyss of the de-
substantialized process as the only 
actuality there is: the subject has no 
substantial actuality, it comes sec-
ond, it only emerges through the 
process of separation, of overcom-
ing of its presuppositions, and these 
presuppositions are also just a ret-
roactive effect of the same process 
of their overcoming. The result is 
thus that there is, at both extremes 
of the process, a failure/negativity 
inscribed into the very heart of the 
entity we are dealing with. If the 
status of the subject is thoroughly 
processual, then it emerges through 
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should aim neither at the complete 
mastery over nature nor at the hu-
manity’s humble acceptance of the 
predominance of Mother Earth. 
Rather, nature should be exposed 
in all its catastrophic contingency 
and indeterminacy, and human 
agency assumed in the whole un-
predictability of its consequences—
viewed from this perspective of the 
“other Hegel,” the revolutionary 
act no longer involves as its agent 
the Lukácsian substance-subject, 
the agent who knows what it does 
while doing it.
Apropos Hegel’s reconciliation 
in a modern postrevolutionary 
state, Jameson proposes the out-
lines of a higher-enlarged version 
of the Hegelian reconciliation, a 
version appropriate for our global 
capitalist epoch: the project of a 
human age characterized by pro-
duction-for-us (the end of classes) 
and ecology (113–15). Jameson’s 
view is that, far from standing for 
the ultimate end of history, the rec-
onciliation proposed at the end of 
the chapter on Spirit in Phenome-
nology is a temporary fragile synthe-
sis—Hegel himself was aware that 
this reconciliation is threatened, as 
is clear from his panicky reaction to 
the revolution of 1830 and the first 
signs of universal democracy. (Re-
call his furious rejection of the Brit-
ish electoral Reform Bill, the first 
step toward universal elections.) 
Is it then not consequent that, in 
view of the new contradictions of 
the nineteenth-century capitalist 
the very failure to fully actualize it-
self. This brings us again to one of 
the possible formal definitions of 
subject: a subject tries to articulate 
(express) itself in a signifying chain, 
this articulation fails, and by means 
and through this failure, the subject 
emerges; the subject is the failure of 
its signifying representation—this 
is why Lacan writes the subject of 
the signifier as ”, as “barred.” In a 
love letter, the very failure of the 
writer to formulate his declaration 
clearly and efficiently, his oscilla-
tions, the letter’s fragmentation, 
etc., can in themselves be the proof 
(perhaps the necessary and the only 
reliable proof) that the professed 
love is authentic—here, the very 
failure to deliver the message prop-
erly is the sign of its authenticity. If 
the message is delivered smoothly, 
it arouses suspicions that it is part 
of a well-planned approach, or that 
the writer loves himself, the beauty 
of his writing, more than his love 
object; that is, that the object is ef-
fectively reduced to a pretext for 
engaging in the narcissistically sat-
isfying activity of writing.
And the same goes for sub-
stance: substance is not only al-
ways already lost but comes to be 
only through its loss, as a second-
ary return-to-itself—which means 
that substance is always already 
subjectivized. In reconciliation be-
tween subject and substance, both 
poles thus lose their firm iden-
tity. Let us take the case of ecol-
ogy: radical emancipatory politics 
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system that exploded the frag-
ile Hegelian synthesis, a renewed 
Hegelian approach that remains 
faithful to the idea of concrete uni-
versality, of universal rights for all, 
“calls in its very structure for the 
subsequent enlargements of later 
history” (115) and for a new project 
of reconciliation? Such a move is 
nonetheless illegitimate: it doesn’t 
take into account radically enough 
that the same paradox as that of 
the retroactive positing of presup-
positions holds also for the future. 
Let us take the case of a nation: to 
paraphrase an old critic of Ernest 
Renan, a nation is a group of people 
united by a mistaken view about 
the past, a hatred of their present 
neighbors, and dangerous illusions 
about their future. (Say, today’s Slo-
venes are united by the myths about 
a Slovene kingdom in the eighth 
century, their hatred of [at this mo-
ment] Croats, and the illusion that 
the Slovenes are on their way to 
become the next Switzerland.) Each 
historical form is a totality that en-
compasses not only its retroactively 
posited past but also its own future, 
a future that is by definition never 
realized: it is the immanent future 
of this present, so that, when the 
present form disintegrates, it under-
mines also its past and its future.
This is why Hegel was right to 
insist that the owl of Minerva takes 
off only at dusk; and this is why the 
standard Communist project was 
utopian precisely insofar as it was 
not radical enough; that is, insofar 
as, in it, the fundamental capital-
ist thrust of unleashed productivity 
survived, deprived of its concrete 
contradictory conditions of exis-
tence. The insufficiency of Hei-
degger, Adorno, and Horkheimer, 
etc., resides in their abandonment 
of the concrete social analysis of 
capitalism: in their very critique or 
overcoming of Marx, they in a way 
repeat Marx’s mistake—like Marx, 
they perceive the unleashed pro-
ductivity as something ultimately 
independent of the concrete capital-
ist social formation. Capitalism and 
Communism are not two different 
historical realizations, two species, 
of instrumental reason—instru-
mental reason as such is capitalist, 
grounded in capitalist relations, and 
“really existing Socialism” failed be-
cause it was ultimately a subspecies 
of capitalism, an ideological attempt 
to have a cake and eat it, to break 
from capitalism while retaining 
its key ingredient. In other words. 
Marx’s notion of the Communist 
society is itself the inherent capital-
ist fantasy; that is, a phantasmatic 
scenario for resolving the capitalist 
antagonism he so aptly described. In 
other words, our wager is that, even 
if we remove the teleological notion 
of Communism (the society of the 
fully unleashed productivity) as the 
implicit standard by which Marx, as 
it were, measures the alienation of 
the existing society, the bulk of his 
critique of political economy, the 
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telling her, “I cannot make love to you 
now, but I need a release—can you suck 
me and swallow my sperm, this would 
help me a lot!” The wife replies, “I am 
too tired to do that now, darling—why 
don’t you just masturbate and finish in 
a glass, and I will drink it in the morn-
ing!” Does not this wife—contrary to 
the cliché about the holistic-intuitive 
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masculine rational analysis—provide an 
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insight into the self-propelling vi-
cious cycle of capitalist (re)produc-
tion, survives.
The task of today’s thought is 
thus double: on the one hand, how 
to repeat the Marxist critique of 
political economy without the uto-
pian/ideological notion of Com-
munism as its inherent standard; on 
the other hand, how to imagine ef-
fectively breaking out of the capital-
ist horizon without falling into the 
trap of returning to the eminently 
premodern notion of a balanced, 
(self-)restrained society (the pre-
Cartesian temptation to which most 
of today’s ecology succumbs).
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